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Abstract 
Mengchuan Lin: Threading On Thin Ice: Resistance and Conciliation in the Jade Marshal’s 
Nationalism, 1919-1939 
(Under the direction of Michael Tsin) 
The 1920s marked a decade in the history of modern China which is typically referred to 
as the period of warlords. This period was characterised by political chaos, internal division and 
internecine warfare between various cliques of military strongmen who controlled China’s 
numerous provinces. These de facto military dictators of China, known as warlords in historical 
literature, were customarily construed to be avaricious and self-serving despots who ruled their 
large territories with little regard for the welfare of their subjects or that of the Chinese nation.   
My thesis aims to revise these previously held assumptions concerning the historical 
agency of Chinese warlords by investigating the unusual conduct of a particularly influential 
warlord: Wu Peifu. Wu’s display of deeply seated nationalistic tendencies throughout his 
political career, I argue, complicates our understanding of the impact that Chinese warlords 
exerted on the rise of Chinese national consciousness during the early 20th century. 
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Introduction 
Paul Cohen argues in History in Three Keys that the historian’s retelling of the past is a 
highly artificial process. By subjecting a discrete chunk of the past to reconstruction, whether in 
the form of a narrative or argument, a historian will invariably alter it to some extent. Depending 
on the degree of the alteration, the reconstructed past will exist primarily as either an event or a 
myth.
1
 Both of these forms need to be distinguished from the experienced past, which represents 
reality. Cohen then proceeds to illustrate the Boxer uprising as event, experience and myth, in 
demonstration of the multifaceted nature of the past. In similar fashion, the warlords of early 
republican China also existed in these three forms. While the warlords reconstructed as event 
denote a particular ordering of the past, they as myth denote a particular ordering of the past to 
justify conditions in the present.  
Many of the stories of warlords in historical literature are mythologised. They are altered 
to a degree that they no longer represent even remotely factual reality, namely, the past as lived 
experience. The chief object of this essay is to retrieve, to the greatest extent possible, the 
experienced past of the warlords. To that end, we will examine warlordism as a phenomenon 
through the prism of the nationalism (minzu zhuyi) of Wu Peifu. Wu, nicknamed the Jade 
Marshal, was a prominent warlord of the period who at the apex of his power had the capability 
to restore unity to a China fragmented by incessant conflicts. Nationalism, as Benedict Anderson 
rightly argues, is the most potent force of the 20th century.
2
 Typically, warlords were not 
construed as champions of nationalism. Before we delve into an extensive discussion of Wu’s 
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individuality and his peculiar brand of nationalism, it is imperative that we fully illustrate how 
warlords are portrayed in the historiography on early Republican China, of both Chinese and 
Western authorship. For if we fail to appreciate the extent to which depictions of warlords are 
imbalanced, being hugely skewed towards the negative, it will be difficult to justify the need for 
scholarly revision of this subject. To this end, the contents of a few seminal works on warlords 
shall be presented so as to elucidate the historical legacy they currently possess among learned 
circles. 
  Warlords do not exactly have a glowing reputation in modern Chinese history. The 
terminology which was coined to describe them in the Chinese language, junfa, is not a neutral 
one. Its pejorative nature is readily manifest in how the very word itself already conjures up 
images of masculinised and gun-toting thugs in the mind. Curiously enough, the word also has a 
way of being retroactively applied to any person who exhibited authoritarian or pro-imperialist 
tendencies in the contemporaneous Chinese political discourse. Extant Chinese-language studies 
present the history of warlords in a highly linear fashion, typically tracing their origin to a 
common progenitor: Yuan Shikai. The death of this ill-fated leader of China’s modern army in 
1916, who counted a three-month emperorship among his manifold legacies, gave rise to the 
major warlord cliques of the era. Many of the warlords who subsequently rose to power were 
Yuan’s former protégés; and their collective imprint on modern Chinese history is one of infamy. 
As the scholar Zhang Jian puts it, “June 6, 1916 marked the much celebrated death of Yuan, a 
great schemer and traitor, who led a life of utter ignominy.”3 He added in the same paragraph 
that Yuan was also the common stooge of imperialist powers. Yuan’s demise split the warlords 
into three major cliques, named after the abbreviation of the provinces to which the hometowns 
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of their respective leaders, Feng Guozhang, Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin, belonged. All three 
warlord cliques were patently cruel reactionary regimes in Zhang Jian’s eyes. Feng Guozhang’s 
Zhili clique, under the leadership of Wu Peifu, was responsible for its suppression of the 
February 7th strike of the workers of the Beijing-Hankou railway. Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian 
clique, a puppet of imperial Japan, was said to have murdered the Communist revolutionary Li 
Dazhao.
4
 In another book, the scholar He Xiongfei describes Wu as an archetypal opportunist, 
who capitalised on the people’s trust of his patriotic pretensions to wreak havoc in China.5  
A strictly negative perception of warlords is so deeply ingrained in the minds of Chinese 
intelligentsia that any alternative depiction of them, even in fiction, invites criticism. In his 
scalding critique of the novel Yanyu Mengmeng by bestselling Taiwanese writer Qiong Yao, 
Chen Donglin accuses Qiong of palliating the crimes of the warlords by portraying the life of the 
fictive warlord Lu Zhenhua in a sympathetic light. Chen’s comments bespeak his intense 
dissatisfaction with Qiong’s writing: 
The chief purpose of Qiong Yao’s creation of the character Lu Zhenhua, as a 
representative of the feudal warlords of old, is to arouse her readers’ sympathy for them. 
She achieves this through steady beautification of Lu’s image, which is initially presented 
as an ugly one. In embellishing at length episodes such as Lu’s reconciliation with his 
daughter Yiping, she hopes to accentuate Lu’s apparent humanity.6 
It thus appears that even fictitious warlords would not be exempt from the condemnation of these 
Chinese historians.  
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 Extant western scholarship, though usually more reserved in their judgement, also 
displays a somewhat essentialist understanding of warlords.
7
 To date, James Sheridan, Donald 
Gillin and Odoric Wou penned three biographical studies on Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan and Wu 
Peifu respectively in the 1960s and 1970s. Admittedly, the works of these scholars seek to 
portray the exploits of these warlords in a more balanced fashion. Gillin, for instance, argues that 
Yan attempted to implement various kinds of reforms during his tenure as the governor of 
Shanxi province. These reforms gave rise to campaigns whose aims ranged from the eradication 
of mass illiteracy to that of the practice of footbinding among peasant women.
8
 Wou similarly 
tries to present Wu as a well-intentioned and pragmatic warlord through the analysis of his 
domestic and foreign policies. By highlighting the progressive nature of the policies of these 
warlord regimes, these older works are largely successful in complicating the notion of warlords 
as belonging to a monolithic category of traitors and reprobates. However, none of them 
specifically tries to situate their warlord subjects in the discourse of anti-imperialist nationalism, 
which powerfully shaped the intellectual landscape of China in the early Republican period. 
Sheridan’s work on Feng serves as an excellent case in point. While his chronicle of Feng is 
replete with fascinating details covering various aspects of the warlord’s career, it is an 
exceedingly linear account which seems to lack a central theme. Presumably, the study was 
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written at a time when English language studies on Feng did not yet exist. More recent studies 
also fail to address the issue of the warlords’ relationship to nationalism vis-à-vis their 
interactions with imperialist powers. Arthur Waldron attempts to trace the etymology of the term 
warlord (junfa) in the political discourse of the early Republican period.
9
 Although his study 
succeeds in illustrating the impact of junfa on the evolution of anti-warlord rhetoric among the 
Chinese intelligentsia, Waldron does not purport to explain the validity of the claims against the 
warlords’ pro-imperialist tendencies. Another scholar, Edward McCord, applies the term 
praetorianism to the prevailing political circumstances of the warlord era.
10
 His association of 
the deeds of Chinese warlords with the notorious Praetorian Guard of ancient Rome, which had a 
penchant for palace intrigue, holds profound implications. The emphasis on the militaristic and 
opportunistic nature of the warlords disregards the multidimensionality of their character and 
motivations for rule. As the record concerning Wu Peifu’s domestic and foreign policy will show, 
McCord’s simple characterisation is flawed.    
Wu Peifu, Running Dog of Imperialism? 
The secondary literature appears to concur that Chinese warlords were characterised by 
their collusion with imperialists and hostility towards progressive elements. These two 
reactionary traits form the basis for the revulsion that scholars hold towards warlords and their 
regimes. It is of particular importance to note that the negative interpretation of the contemporary 
Chinese intellectuals seems to strangely echo the tone of their counterparts who wrote about the 
warlords during the 1920s. Gao Zhenxiao, a prominent intellectual of the period and a hero of the 
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1911 Xinghai Revolution, penned an open telegram to that effect.
11
 In it, he minced no words in 
listing systematically the many heinous crimes which Wu Peifu perpetrated against the Chinese 
people and nation. Wu’s iniquity was so great, Gao asserted, that it far surpassed all of his 
predecessors, namely Li Yuanhong, Yuan Shikai and Xu Shichang, the three former presidents 
of the Republic of China. The telegram was also laden with invectives such as villain (zei) and 
rebel (ni); for to Gao, Wu’s misdeeds equalled those of notorious rebels such as Li Zicheng and 
Zhang Xianzhong. Li and Zhang were the principal leaders of the peasant rebellions of the early 
17th century, which toppled the Ming dynasty in 1644. In closing, Gao called for the people of 
China to unite and join in the expedition to overthrow Wu so as to rescue the nation from certain 
doom.
12
  
If the contents of Gao’s telegram seem to be somewhat vague, the following 
announcement, written by a certain Li Chengxuan, provided a clear reason for denouncing Wu: 
Wu Peifu, the stooge (zougou) of the British imperialists, is currently being surrounded 
by forces of the National Revolutionary Army in Wuhan; his downfall is imminent. Wu’s 
fall is tantamount to the defeat of British imperialism in China. The British are already 
powerless to influence the current government in Beijing, under the control of the pro-
Japanese Zhang Zuolin. Britain’s extensive commercial interests along the Yangtze will 
soon also be undermined. Thus, they are doing everything in their power to aid Wu.
13
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Li Chengxuan was one of the code names which the Chinese Communist Party employed to 
release official documents during the period of the First United Front, which was a temporary 
alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists against the warlords. The above 
notice, which denounced Wu for his imperialist leanings, was addressed to the students of the 
class of 1926 of the Whampoa Military Academy. Many of their graduated classmates were then 
serving as commanders in the army that embarked on the Northern Expedition, which was a 
military campaign launched by the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in 1926. The chief aim 
of the campaign was to eradicate the various warlord regimes of the time. The defeat of Wu’s 
forces, in particular was central to the success of the Northern Expedition. In the above notice, 
the Chinese Communists accused the British of assisting Wu in three ways: 1) fabricating war 
reports, which the London news agency Reuters then disseminated to mislead the public; 2) 
sending aid from their colony in Hong Kong to Chen Jiongming and other right-wing 
reactionaries who planned to create disturbances in Guangdong, the base of the Communists and 
the Nationalists; 3) dispatching fleets of warships to Hankou, Wu’s base, to assist him in halting 
the advance of the Nationalist forces.
14
 Furthermore, the notice claimed from a September 3 
article of Dalu Bao that some British warships in the port of Hankou had opened fire on the 
Nationalist troops. At the end, the Whampoa students were ordered to “create anti-British 
slogans and rally the people’s support in thwarting the machinations of the British 
imperialists.”15 
 In order to accord Wu a fair appraisal of his overall impact on modern Chinese history, 
we must first ascertain the validity of the above claims of his allegedly treasonous dealings with 
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imperial powers. To that end, a number of sources pertaining to Wu’s relations with imperialists 
and pro-imperialist factions will be investigated. We will be able to see that his stance in 
diplomacy had always been markedly anti-imperialist. In fact, he consistently sought to buttress 
his anti-imperialist rhetoric with concrete action whenever the circumstances permitted. For 
instance, on matters of principle, such as the preservation of China’s territorial integrity, he stood 
absolutely firm. It must be noted however that Wu’s brand of anti-imperialist nationalism was 
also deeply pragmatic; he would only choose to go head to head with the imperialists on the 
condition that net gains would be made for the Chinese nation. If he perceived that any 
confrontation with imperial powers would actually put vital national interests in jeopardy, he 
would often opt for a conciliatory approach in the resolution of disputes with imperialist powers.  
The Nascent Form of Wu’s Nationalism 
 Wu first unveiled his anti-imperialist sentiments on the national stage in 1919, in the 
aftermath of a series of events that later came to be called the May Fourth Movement. The 
movement, precipitated by mass student demonstrations against ineffectual governmental effort 
to resolve the issue of the retrocession of Germany’s colonial holdings under the Treaty of 
Versailles, marked the high tide of anti-imperialism in the early Republican era. China had 
participated in World War I on the side of the Allied Triple Entente in the hopes that Germany’s 
defeat would result in the return of its concessions in Shandong to Chinese control. Over the 
course of the war, the Chinese government, then under the control of Anfu clique leader Duan 
Qirui, contributed 140000 labourers to the Allies’ war effort in Europe. At the postwar Paris 
Peace Conference however, the victorious Allies decided to award the German concessions to 
Japan. This was because the Japanese had entered the war on the side of the Allies and attacked 
German colonies in the Far East. The Chinese delegation remonstrated to no avail. News of the 
9 
 
fresh diplomatic humiliation enraged the public, particularly the students of Beijing’s elite 
universities, who staged massive protests against the government and called for the boycott of 
Japanese goods. An anti-Japanese conflagration quickly swept across the entire country.  
During the time of the May Fourth protests, Wu was only a commander of a division of 
the Zhili army stationed in Hunan. Despite his modest rank, he and his subordinates sent an open 
telegram to Xu Shichang, the president of the republic, voicing their support for the students. In 
that telegram, Wu stated that he was pleased to hear news from Wuhan and Shanghai that the 
Chinese delegation had decided to not, until they received further orders from Beijing, sign the 
Treaty of Versailles. “Such an act demonstrates that President Xu is receptive to public opinion 
and China still has diplomats who are willing to defend the nation’s interests,” Wu declared 
triumphantly. After urging the president to stand resolute in the face of divisive counsel at home 
and potential threat from abroad, he requested that Xu do four things: 1) immediately send a 
telegram to encourage the Chinese delegation to continue to stand their ground; 2) petition the 
Western powers, particularly the American president Woodrow Wilson for assistance in breaking 
the diplomatic impasse, and in the event of failure, prepare to present the case to the League of 
Nations; 3) appease the public by informing them of the Chinese delegation’s rejection of the 
Treaty of Versailles and charge anyone who proposes agreeing to the terms of the treaty with 
treason; 4) appoint the Chinese delegate Wang Zhengting as China’s representative to the 
League of Nations and place him in full charge of the Shandong Problem, so as to alleviate the 
burden of Lu Zhengxiang, who was head of the delegation.
16
 Wang had been the most insistent 
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about China’s refusal to sign the treaty. Wu’s final remarks in the telegram evinced his strong 
nationalistic sentiments: 
The Japanese are using intimidating tactics against China. Our government should deal 
with them calmly and refuse to submit. Since a peace conference is already under way in 
Western Europe, the Great Powers shall not permit militarism after the manner of 
Germany to arise in East Asia. If Japan threatens us with war, we should appeal to the 
Western powers to designate theatres of combat and prepare to counter with 
commensurate force. China has millions of soldiers and hundreds of generals. Are all of 
them only capable of fighting among themselves? Will they all back down in the face 
external enemies? I think not! My troops, united by the potentiality that they might 
finally fight enemies from outside, are all eagerly readying themselves for battle. In the 
event that the nation requires our service, we request to be placed in the vanguard.
17
 
The wording of this telegram, replete with nationalistic fervour, soon made Wu the new 
hero of the nation. The public showered him with accolade for his avowals of resistance against 
Japan. The Shanghai newspaper Minguo Ribao published a commentary stating that Wu’s recent 
deeds proved his “candour, patriotism and profound sense of righteousness.” 18  Public 
disapproval of the weak and pro-Japanese government of the Anfu clique had been steadily 
growing in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement. Wu, seeing the opportunity, formed an 
alliance with the Fengtian leader Zhang Zuolin and decided to challenge the Anfu-led 
government. In July, 1920, he issued a manifesto on behalf of the Zhili army and announced his 
desire to eradicate the Anfu clique. In it, he first observed that since the founding of the republic 
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in 1911, China had experienced nine years of almost incessant strife, and the responsibility for 
the country’s chaos lay with the politicians and the military. In his words, “The military 
possesses the sacred duty to defend the Chinese nation and people. But at the same time it is also 
a double-edged sword. If employed properly, it can fulfil its duty of defending the nation; if not, 
it can become an instrument of evil that puts the lives of the people in jeopardy.”19 Wu then went 
on to accuse the Anfu leaders of gross misgovernance in a number of ways: 1) filling parliament 
with bribed pro-Anfu politicians, turning the legislative body into a rubber stamp for the Anfu 
clique; 2) condoning widespread corruption in the bureaucracy and encouraging nepotism, 
resulting in the allocation of many important posts to Anfu affiliates; 3) selling monopolies, 
railway and mineral rights and borrowing vast foreign loans, putting the country in heavy debt.
20
 
In light of these Anfu misdeeds, Wu astutely pointed out that the majority of issues plaguing 
China were related to the people’s livelihood (fanwan wenti): “The impoverished masses, faced 
with abysmal living standards, had no choice but to destabilise society in numerous ways. The 
workers’ frequent strikes are one such example.”21 If this was allowed to continue, he warned the 
survival of the nation would be at stake. The Anfu leaders defended against Wu’s charges by 
claiming that any attempt to break up their government would severely disturb the political status 
quo, and also nullify the parliament and by extension the office of the presidency. In rebuttal, 
Wu declared, “The parliament and the office of the presidency should reflect the will of the 
people (minyi), and as such should not become the pawns of a single party or clique. As for fears 
that the Anfu clique might resist its disbandment with military force, which would spark civil 
war, we must remember that only the top Anfu leaders have vested interests in the clique’s 
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survival, not the majority of its rank and file soldiers. Since it is clear that the Anfu clique has 
earned the disfavour of many Chinese nationals (guoren), it must be disbanded, regardless of the 
violation of any legal technicalities.”22 The concluding remarks of the manifesto trumpeted Wu’s 
steadfast devotion to the people’s welfare and his absolute commitment to depose the Anfu 
leaders.       
During the short nine-day Anfu-Zhili War that followed, the Zhili army, under Wu’s 
overall command, emerged victorious. The defeat of the Anfu clique saw the formation of a joint 
government between the Zhili and Fengtian cliques. Public opinion was overwhelmingly on the 
side of Wu’s Zhili clique during the short war. On July 16, the prominent newspaper Shen Bao 
published a petition by over one hundred Shanghai commercial organisations that celebrated 
Wu’s fulfilment of his promise to exterminate the Anfu clique made early in the month. They 
declared that China’s “400 million compatriots” (tongbao) swore to stand behind Wu on account 
of his righteous campaign against the corrupt Anfu government.
23
 
The Poetic Origins of Wu Peifu’s Anti-Imperialist Nationalism 
Wu’s staunchly militant response to Japan’s seizure of the Shandong concessions, his 
support of the May Fourth student demonstrations and his opposition to the pro-Japanese Anfu 
government were all testaments to his anti-imperialist nationalism. The many praises he received 
in the newspapers affirmed the public’s approval of his nationalistic stance. In fact, Wu’s 
antagonism towards Japanese imperialism can be traced to some of his own early writings. A 
native of Penglai, located in Shandong province, Wu received considerable training as a classical 
scholar in his youth and had in fact obtained the licentiate (xiucai) degree, which was awarded to 
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candidates who passed the imperial examination at the county level.
24
 His classical education 
imparted him the literary skills to compose poems in the classical style. The ability to do so was 
not only rare among warlords, but scholars as well, for the Chinese language was then 
undergoing a process of vernacularisation. In the poem Deng Penglaige Ge written after a tour of 
the famous Penglai Pagoda, he lamented:  
Dwarf bandits are running rampant across the land. The Jiawu war diminished our 
territory and the Jiachen war undermined our sovereignty. The motherland is filled with 
barbarians! I wish I could be placed at the head of a strong army and reclaim our lost 
territories in one battle. Will that day ever come?
25
  
Dwarf bandit (wokou) was a derogatory term which the Chinese first used to describe pirates 
from Japan who raided China’s coastal areas during the 15th and 16th centuries. The word wo 
probably owed its origin to the name which the Emperor Guangwu of the Han dynasty bestowed 
on the small state of Nakoku (nuguo) on the Japanese island of Kyūshū.26 The two wars which 
Wu alluded to in the poem were the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. In the 
former conflict, the defeated China had to cede Taiwan to the Japanese. In the latter conflict, the 
belligerents Russia and Japan fought over their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and 
the Chinese were powerless to stop them. Wu’s reference to these humiliating episodes, both of 
which occurred during his lifetime, spoke to his heartfelt desire to revitalise the feeble Chinese 
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nation. In fact, he turned his poem into a marching song for drilling his troops in Luoyang, 
urging them to treat Japan as the imaginary enemy and avenge China’s loss in the Jiawu war.27  
Several other poems of Wu also contained very strong nationalistic overtones. In Huaigu 
Ershou for instance, he extolled the exploits of Yue Fei and Lin Zexu, vowing to “emulate the 
latter’s example and devote great effort to building up the military capabilities of the country.”28 
Yue was a renowned general of the Southern Song dynasty who won many battles against the 
Jurchen invaders of northern China. Lin was a scholar-official of the late Qing dynasty who 
devised the opium suppression campaign against the Western merchants in Canton. Also, in the 
poem Ru Shu, Wu quoted a well-known phrase, usually attributed to Huo Qubing, to demonstrate 
his resolve to defend the country against foreign invaders.
29
 Huo was a general of the Han 
dynasty who fought against the Xiongnu, a loose confederation of nomadic peoples who lived in 
the Mongolian steppes and parts of central Asia. He allegedly uttered the phrase quoted in Wu’s 
poem to express his desire to never establish a stable family until his Xiongnu enemies were 
exterminated. Clearly, the recurrence of motifs such as war, ancient heroes and external foes in 
these poems reflected Wu’s deep desire to protect and strengthen China militarily, particularly in 
response to the growing threat of Japanese imperialism. 
Wu Peifu’s Continued Resistance against Soviet Imperialism 
Wu’s anti-imperialist nationalism not only manifested in the form of resistance against 
Japanese encroachment on Chinese territories, but that of other imperial powers as well. After his 
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victory over Zhang Zuolin in the First Zhili-Fengtian War in June, 1922, he became the de facto 
ruler of much of northern and central China. It was under such circumstances that the Soviet 
Union dispatched Adolph Joffe to China in the autumn of the same year. The ostensible goal of 
the Soviet envoy’s visit was to negotiate with the Chinese government about the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. Technically, such matters should be handled 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. But being a seasoned diplomat, Joffe 
recognised that obtaining the goodwill of Wu, the real power behind the Beijing government, 
would be more vital to the success of his mission. Hence, he wrote a series of three long letters to 
Wu, attempting to convince him of the benefits of friendship with the Soviet Union. The contents 
of these letters, though couched in a seemingly respectful and innocuous language, laid bare the 
Soviet Union’s imperialist ambitions in China.  
In his first letter addressed to Wu on August 19, Joffe began with flattery, praising Wu 
for possessing “the perspicacity of a philosopher, the resoluteness of a seasoned politician and 
the sagacity of a military strategist.”30 After stating that it would be his utmost honour to meet 
personally with China’s most illustrious politician and general, Joffe proceeded to reassure Wu 
of the Soviets’ good intentions towards China: “the Soviet people are deeply concerned with the 
Chinese people’s struggles to free their nation from the yoke of imperialism. The Soviet Union 
too is currently engaged in a heroic struggle against the combined forces of the imperialists of 
the world. Perceiving that our goal is mutual, the Soviet Union is fully committed to assisting 
China.”31 In the same vein, Joffe continued, “I perceive upon arriving in Beijing that the Chinese 
government seemed to doubt the sincerity of the Soviet government’s appeals for negotiations, 
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fearing that we might have some conspiracy in mind. In actual fact, the Soviet Union has 
absolutely no intention to do anything of the sort, but is prepared to accommodate China’s 
interests on the basis of our general foreign policy.”32 Joffe explained further that the Soviet 
government had also tasked him with negotiating with Japan about the issue of Japanese 
occupation of Russia’s far eastern territories. But because he considered Sino-Soviet relations to 
be of greater importance, he had deliberately delayed negotiations with the Japanese. After much 
prevarication, he finally unveiled his true mission in China, which was twofold: 1) persuading 
the Chinese to send an observer to a future negotiation to be held between the Soviet Union and 
Japan in Changchun; 2) obtaining Chinese acquiescence in the stationing of Soviet troops in 
Outer Mongolia.
33
 Seeking a solution to the Mongolian Problem was Joffe’s most important task. 
The Soviets had dispatched troops to occupy parts of Outer Mongolia, which belonged to the late 
Qing empire, during the Russian Civil War. The Mongolians, for their part, had acquiesced in the 
Soviet occupation. Some had even actively colluded with the Soviets. Being aware of Mongolian 
compliance, Joffe insisted that the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia was 
only to prevent White Russian forces from re-establishing themselves in the region. Soviet 
presence, he argued, would also forestall any attempt on the part of Zhang Zuolin to occupy 
Outer Mongolia. Zhang’s Fengtian clique was hostile to both the Soviets and Wu. In closing, 
Joffe accused the Japanese of proliferating rumours that the Soviets harboured imperialist 
designs on China and appealed to Wu to quickly establish a formal treaty with his country.  
In two subsequent letters addressed to Wu on September 18 and November 18, Joffe 
continued to press him to accept the status quo in Outer Mongolia: “The imperialists, in order to 
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defend their own policy of aggression in China, are using the Mongolian issue to discredit us. 
Unfortunately, certain individuals in Chinese society had fallen right into the trap. Instead of 
opposing the stationing of foreign troops in Beijing or other similar measures to carve a 
sovereign nation into spheres of influence, they have decided to protest against the presence of 
Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia.” 34  He warned further that the Mongolian Problem would 
become a severe impediment to the restoration of friendly relations between China and the 
Soviet Union.
35
 In addition to urging Wu to relinquish Chinese control of Outer Mongolia, Joffe 
also tried to persuade him to establish a joint government with Sun Yat-sen. Sun was leader of 
the Nationalist government in Guangzhou, which opposed Wu’s Zhili-controlled Beijing 
government. Joffe insisted that only such an alliance would bring about China’s unification and 
ensure Soviet support,
36
 and it was the only “correct policy” for Wu to implement.37 
Wu, for his part, was adamantly opposed to Soviet meddling in Outer Mongolia. The 
contents of the following telegram, which he sent in early November to Wang Huaiqing, the 
Chinese inspector-general of Rehe (a special administrative district bordering Mongolia), made 
his anti-Soviet position abundantly clear: 
Soviet Russia, harbouring ambitions to invade Mongolia, is coaxing the Outer 
Mongolians to form companies which are then placed under the control of Russian 
managers. They operate in accordance with Russian laws and enjoy monopolies over all 
railroad, mining, power and gas interests. The Russians’ irregular behaviour (yiju) is 
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highly suspect. Should they annex Mongolia, other Chinese territories will too be 
endangered (chunwang chihan). As the inspector-general of the borderlands, your 
proximity enables you to acquire the most accurate information on this matter. Please 
petition the president to undertake urgent measures to ascertain Soviet intentions in 
Mongolia by interrogating Joffe. If he attempts to equivocate, the posts and 
communications agency should intercept his correspondences and search for clues which 
might illuminate the Mongolian situation.
38
 
In the same telegram, Wu stated that he believed Outer Mongolia’s position vis-à-vis China and 
Russia was akin to that of Alsace-Lorraine for Germany and France. Consequently, it should 
serve as a peaceful buffer zone between the two countries. Moreover, since Outer Mongolia had 
traditionally belonged to China, Wu asserted that the Chinese government had the right to 
abolish any type of local government that the Russians sought to establish in that area.
39
  
 The above exchanges between Wu and Joffe, in which the former sought to defend 
China’s territorial integrity from Soviet imperialism, serve as further proof for his anti-
imperialist nationalism. 
Wu Peifu’s Final Stand against Japanese Imperialism 
Wu maintained his anti-imperialist position throughout his career, which reached its 
zenith between 1922 and 1926. The periodical Time, since its founding in March, 1923, had 
regularly presented articles concerning his exploits. In fact, he became the first Chinese to be 
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featured on the cover page of the magazine in September, 1924.
40
 More importantly, Wu 
remained a staunch opponent of Japanese imperialism even to his death. After the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan gained the upper hand and captured large parts of 
northern and eastern China during the initial phase of the war. In order to effectively rule these 
newly acquired territories, the Japanese searched desperately for preeminent Chinese politicians 
who were willing to collaborate with them. Wu, then residing in Beijing, became a prime target 
for Japanese co-option, due in no small part to his well-established reputation among ordinary 
Chinese. The Japanese repeatedly sent Kenji Doihara to inveigle Wu into complying with their 
demands to head a puppet government in Beijing. Doihara was a general in the Imperial Japanese 
Army, notorious for orchestrating the Mukden Incident of 1931 in which the Japanese invaded 
Manchuria on the pretext of a staged railway explosion. Wu, for his part, adamantly refused to 
become a traitor to the nation by assuming the mantle of a puppet leader. As an article from the 
February 6, 1939 issue of Time informs us, he would only agree to Japan’s peace terms on two 
“novel” conditions: 1) immediate withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China; 2) permission to 
swear fealty to Chiang Kai-shek’s government, which had established itself in the hinterland to 
continue the war against Japan.
41
 Evidently for a period of time Wu also deviously led his 
Japanese cajolers into believing that he might be amenable to a compromise, to the extent that 
Japan’s Dōmei news agency reported on several occasions that he had agreed to head the puppet 
government.
42
 However, when the time finally arrived for his formal acceptance, at a party to 
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which foreign correspondents were invited, Wu’s declaration shocked the Japanese: “I shall 
become a puppet on the day when you little men go back to your little islands.”43  
The contents of a short memoir written by Liu Siying, who was a former aide of Wu, 
should make his determination to resist collaboration with the Japanese even clearer. In the 
memoir, Liu recounted that he travelled to visit Wu in Beijing on behalf of Chiang’s government 
in December, 1938. His main task was to deliver a letter, written by Kong Xiangxi, the vice-
premier of the Executive Yuan, to Wu. In order to safely convey the letter, Liu had to sew it into 
the lining of his clothes so as to prevent it from being discovered by the Japanese occupation 
authorities.
44
 In that letter, Kong, after first praising Wu for his “intense patriotism, keen sense of 
justice and resilient spirit,” asked him for advice on “saving the nation.”45 Liu then explained to 
Wu the details of Chiang’s plan of making the Japanese fight a war of attrition by trading 
China’s huge space for time. Wu agreed with Chiang’s overall strategic vision, stating, “If we 
can persevere and refuse to compromise halfway, the Japanese are bound to lose! But alas, the 
people of Sichuan (where Chiang’s provisional capital was located) shall surely suffer! Please 
exhort our compatriots in the Southeast to support Mr. Chiang’s war of resistance against Japan! 
Although Mr. Chiang and I were erstwhile foes, we have the same duty to defend the nation. If I 
had been the one who unified China, the responsibility for organising the war effort against 
Japan would no doubt have fallen on me now. Regardless, I shall do everything in my power to 
help Mr. Chiang succeed in his war against Japan and hope our compatriots in the Southeast will 
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support me.”46 Wu then wrote a reply to Kong, thanking him for his concern and assuring him 
that even though he was living in occupied territory, he had managed to remain “unwavering and 
unperturbed (anru taishan).” 47  Before Liu left, Wu specifically asked him to convey three 
suggestions to Chiang: 1) stamp out corruption in the his government so as to win over the 
people’s hearts (renxin); 2) pay particular attention to diplomacy and try to use the British and 
the Americans against Japan; 3) start planning measures to deal with the future threat of the 
Communists, whose strength were growing day by day in northern China.
48
  
In addition to Liu’s memoir, another memoir, written by Zhang Bolun, informs us of 
many rich details of Wu’s last days in Beijing, during which he continued to evince the kind of 
anti-imperialist nationalism that came to define his early career. Zhang was Wu’s loyal secretary 
and edited many of Wu’s speeches.49 Being an eyewitness, his memoir also sheds light on the 
somewhat suspicious circumstances surrounding Wu’s death. After Doihara’s failures to obtain 
Wu’s consent to play puppet, the Japanese entrusted Major General Kawamoto with the same 
daunting task. Kawamoto knew that Wu had by then become a devout Buddhist. Therefore, he 
first sought to develop a personal relationship with Wu by becoming his disciple, before 
attempting to co-opt him. To the great dismay of Kawamoto however, his “master” saw through 
the ruse and instead used the teacher-student relationship to admonish his fake pupil.
50
 In the 
meantime, Wang Jingwei, the leader of the Japanese puppet government in Nanjing, had also 
come to Beijing to convince Wu of the worthiness of his collaborationist cause. Wang offered to 
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let Wu take full charge of the military affairs of his regime.
51
 In a series of correspondences 
exchanged between the two men from May through October, 1939, Wang attempted to impress 
upon Wu the folly of resisting Japan, and averred that “peaceful cooperation would allow the 
government to focus on the internal threat of the Communists.”52 In reply, Wu sternly rebuked 
Wang’s defeatist logic, and enunciated that “his fate shall be tied to the nation’s survival.”53 An 
article from the Nationalist newspaper Zhongyang Ribao described a dramatic incident which 
demonstrated Wu’s aversion to collaboration with Wang. Apparently, during a meeting held 
earlier in the year with Chen Zhongfu, a functionary of Wang’s puppet government, Wu had 
slammed his fist on the table and shouted, “Whoever agrees to cooperate with Wang, that person 
must be truly depraved!”54 The article proceeds to tell us that Wu passed a personal copy of Wen 
Tianxiang’s Zhengqi Ge to Chen and told him to give it to Wang. Wen was a scholar-official of 
the Southern Song dynasty who refused to surrender to the Mongols.
55
 After hopes of Wang and 
Wu forming a joint government were crushed, the Japanese made a last ditch effort at forcing the 
latter’s compliance. They proposed to let Wu become the ruler of a huge piece of territory in 
northern and central China, by setting aside for him six provinces: Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Henan, 
Hebei and Shandong. Curiously enough, his old domain had once consisted of the majority of 
these same provinces. Again, he refused to take the bait, announcing that he would only submit if 
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the Japanese agreed to his terms first.
56
 As Zhang noted in his memoir, even the people of 
Beijing seemed to trust Wu’s integrity. When faced with rumours of Wu’s possible surrender to 
the Japanese, some of them responded, “Is the great marshal (dashuai) really going to re-enter 
politics (chushan)? We doubt it. Even if he does, he will have good reasons.”57 
The Japanese, rebuffed by Wu’s repeated refusals to collaborate, were becoming 
desperate. As his secretary Zhang reported, Wu had chronic dental problems.
58
 One night, during 
a dinner at which Zhang was also present, Wu’s gum was lacerated by a tiny stone in the food. 
Wu’s wife then called in a Japanese dentist named Ito to treat her husband’s ailing tooth. Ito 
promptly extracted the supposedly bad tooth. On the following day, Wu’s left cheek turned 
completely swollen. After medicine prescribed by a Chinese doctor failed to cure the 
swollenness, the family called in the German doctor Stephens. Upon diagnosis, Stephens 
believed the infection could be cured, but Wu would need to undergo surgery at the hospital in 
the Legation Quarter. Wu knew that the Legation Quarter was part of the foreign concessions 
and refused to go. He told his wife, “Should I faint from the pain, don’t send me to the Legation 
Quarter to be treated. If you violate my Three No Principles, I shall no longer consider you my 
wife,” for he vowed to never do three things in life: 1) enter foreign concessions; 2) amass 
personal wealth; 3) borrow foreign loans.
59
 In the afternoon of December 4, 1939, four men, Qi 
Xieyuan, Fu Dingyi, Kawamoto and Ishida came to Wu’s residence. The two Chinese were 
collaborators and Ishida was the director of the army hospital for the Japanese garrison forces in 
Beijing. According to Zhang’s description, the four men, “after conspiring in the meeting room, 
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went upstairs to Wu’s bedroom.” Ishida then performed surgery on Wu, during which Wu 
sustained a fatal injury to his windpipe, leading to his death.
60
 An article from the December 18 
issue of Time reported sceptically that the Japanese attributed the cause of Wu’s death to “a bad 
dental abscess.”61 Circumstantial evidence concerning Wu’s sudden death from dental abscess all 
indicated the possibility of foul play involving the Japanese. In fact, Zhongyang Ribao published 
an article two days after his death in which the reporter directly accused the Japanese and the 
Chinese collaborators of complicity in Wu’s death.62 
The Pragmatic Side of Wu’s Nationalism 
As the evidence show, Wu had adopted a predominantly combative attitude towards 
imperialist powers in his long career. His militancy notwithstanding, Wu’s interactions with the 
imperialists were not only characterised by opposition, but also conciliation. He recognised that a 
purely confrontational approach towards resolving diplomatic incidents did not always yield the 
optimal result of soliciting cooperation or compensation from the imperialists. In the event that 
he found himself unable to respond to the imperialists’ challenges with sufficient force, he was 
often flexible enough to resort to the use of conciliatory measures.  
Sun Danlin, a close aide of Wu, recounts an incident in his memoir which illuminates the 
delicate relationship between the warlord and Britain. In the months of July and August of 1921, 
Wu’s Zhili army capitalised on a regional conflict between the minor warlords of Sichuan and 
Hubei to seize control of the latter province. After his forces captured Yichang, Bi Weiyuan, an 
aide of Wu, advised him to establish a bureau in the city to collect the salt surplus which might 
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then be used to finance military expenditures.
63
 The salt surplus was a tax collected that 
constituted the remainder to the amount which was typically used by the central government to 
repay foreign loans. Major cities in China, such as Yichang in Hubei, all had inspectorates for 
the collection of the salt revenue. Governors in the provinces were supposed to forward the 
surplus to Beijing on a regular basis. Wu, who had just been promoted to the post of inspector-
general of Hubei and Hunan, had no prerogative to collect the salt surplus for his own use. 
Nevertheless, he acceded to the proposal owing to his deep trust of Bi, who enjoyed a close 
personal relationship to the warlord, being both his old friend as well as matchmaker.
64
 
Predictably, Wu’s actions invited the wrath of the British, who considered his collection of the 
salt surplus illegal and deleterious to their commercial interests in the region. Shortly after the 
establishment of the salt surplus bureau, the British ambassador to China Beilby Alston enacted 
three measures to counter Wu: 1) picketing marines around the salt inspectorate in Yichang to 
prevent the collection of the salt surplus; 2) lodging a formal protest with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Beijing; 3) requesting British warships in Shanghai and Hong Kong to converge on 
Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, in a demonstration of force against Wu. The ministry, in response 
to the British complaint, ordered Wu to immediately stop his collection of the salt surplus. Wu 
was initially intransigent. He refused to bow to the British demands and threatened to close the 
British-owned HSBC bank and other British businesses in retaliation. Alston, perceiving the 
warlord’s antagonism, ordered the British warships to train their guns on Wu’s inspector-general 
offices in Wuchang and Hankou, in addition to stationing marines onshore in another show of 
force. He also sent envoy Barton to Luoyang to negotiate with Wu. Sun tells us in his memoir 
                                                          
63
 Sun Danlin, “Wu Peifu yu Yin Mei de guanxi (1964)” in Wenshi ziliao cungao xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongguo 
wenshi chubanshe, 2002), 401. 
 
64
 Ibid. 
26 
 
that Wu had, by this time, realised that further escalation of tensions would undermine his 
interests in Hubei. Therefore, he sought Sun’s advice on the resolution of this diplomatic incident. 
Sun suggested that instead of discussing the salt surplus issue with Barton, Wu should try to earn 
the envoy’s personal favour so as to propitiate the British ambassador. Wu agreed, prepared a 
feast for Barton, invited him to inspect his troops and arranged for a staff officer to accompany 
him on a tour of Luoyang. During the tour Wu’s officer purchased a few antiques for Barton, 
who gladly accepted the gifts, even though they were all counterfeits. Upon his return to Beijing, 
Barton persuaded his superiors to settle the dispute peacefully. The ensuing negotiations yielded 
an outcome in favour of Wu, with the British offering him a one-time payment of two million 
dollars in salt revenue on the condition that he would stop further collection of the salt surplus in 
Yichang.
65
 
Wu’s response to another incident involving the Japanese also revealed the pragmatic 
dimension of his anti-imperialist nationalism. On June 1, 1923, the residents of Changsha, the 
capital of Hunan, clashed with a group of passengers from a Japanese merchantman. Later in the 
day, fully armed Japanese marines from the warship Fushimi came ashore. They first discharged 
warning shots into the air, which infuriated the crowd of gathering residents, who angrily 
confronted the marines. The standoff eventually turned into another violent clash, in which the 
marines killed two Chinese and wounded many others. The incident, known as the June 1 
Massacre (liuyi canan), precipitated a wave of anti-Japanese protests in Changsha. The situation 
had become so volatile that Zhao Hengti, the military governor of Hunan, gravely reported in his 
urgent telegram to Beijing that “the students, workers and merchants had gone on strike and 
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started to boycott Japanese goods.”66 By July, anti-Japanese protests had spread to neighbouring 
provinces. The political instability of China exacerbated the tense climate, for the central 
government was undergoing a power transition at the time, in which Cao Kun, the leader of the 
Zhili clique, had just ousted the president Li Yuanhong from office. The temporarily leaderless 
government in Beijing was thus in no position to deal with the chaotic aftermath of the June 1 
Incident. The Japanese knew the futility of seeking a diplomatic resolution through Beijing 
directly. So they dispatched Hayashi Kyujiro, the consul of Hankou, to Luoyang instead, whose 
mission was to persuade Wu to appeal to Beijing to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiments in 
China. Wu held the post of inspector-general of Zhili, Shandong and Henan, and was the real 
power behind the ascendant Zhili clique. He initially declined Kyujiro’s request, affirming the 
validity of the anti-Japanese demonstrations, which he ascribed to the patriotic feelings of the 
Chinese public. However after much deliberation, he ultimately petitioned Cao to stop the 
nationwide anti-Japanese protests, citing the avoidance of severe repercussions to Sino-Japanese 
commercial relations as the chief reason for such a conciliatory measure.
67
  
Conclusion 
The life of the Jade Marshal was a colourful one to say the least. In him we find the 
peculiar combination of a scholar and a soldier. As we have seen, Wu’s scholarly pretensions 
manifested in his predilection for epic poetry, written in the style of the men of renown of 
ancient times. They were also made evident by his intensely puritanical values, no doubt a 
product of his early classical education. In a speech made in an officer training school in Sichuan, 
he exhorted the candidates to abide by six abstentions. They were supposed to refrain from 
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excessive alcohol consumption, sexual promiscuity, wealth accumulation, personal vendettas, 
opium smoking and gambling.
68
 As a military man, Wu deeply revered his forebears; the names 
of Chinese generals of old made famous by their resistance against foreign invaders frequently 
appeared in his writings. He also believed that the moral integrity of a soldier rested in his 
absolute loyalty to his superiors and the nation.
69
   
The duality of Wu’s character was what defined his nationalism. As a soldier whose duty 
was to defend the nation, he could not abide by attempts on the part of the imperialists to carve 
China into pieces. While it was beyond his strength to restore territory which had already been 
ceded, he committed fully to counteract such attempts in a variety of ways which we have seen. 
Furthermore, as a man of principle, he refused to join the collaborationist cause even though his 
life was in mortal peril. However, he was also circumspect enough to moderate his tough anti-
imperialist stance when the odds appeared to be against him. The disparity in military power 
between Wu and the imperialists often necessitated the use of conciliatory tactics in diplomatic 
incidents. On occasions Wu even exhibited self-serving tendencies, which in no way discounted 
his overall anti-imperialist creed but only emphasised the complexity of his character and the 
circumstances he faced. After all, he was a leader who exercised, even at the height of his power, 
limited control over China, in an international environment that did not evolve to the country’s 
advantage. Accordingly, he made fairly judicious use of his authority to strike a delicate balance 
between the consolidation of the interests of his own clique and that of China as a whole. If he 
was indeed a warlord, he had at least been a relatively unique one. 
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